GRUPO DE RIO. 1991 En inglés

United Nations Institute  for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), Conference of Latin American and Caribbean Research Institutes, Sao Paulo (Brazil), 2-3 December 1991, págs. 149-158

SECOND RESPONSE

Collective Security in Latin America as Reflected in the Agendas of the Summit Meetings of the Rio Group

Alfredo Bruno Bologna

Introduction

            Following the Second World War, the world split into two blocs; democracy prevailed in one and totalitarianism in the other. This phase in international relations, which is known as the “cold war”, contained periods of strong hostility between the United States of America and the Soviet Union, as well as periods of “peaceful coexistence” in which the super-Powers achieved a degree of understanding, relaxation of tension or détente and signed important disarmament and cooperation agreements not only on various items on the bilateral agenda, but with an eye to international society.

            Just as there was a first cold war and a first period of détente, it can be said that there was a renewal of the cold war starting with the accession of Ronald Reagan to the United States presidency in 1981 and a revival of détente in the closing stages of President Reagan’s Republican Administration.

            At all events, this new stage in international relations, referred to as the post-cold-war period and directed towards the shaping of a new international order, has not yet overcome the former division of the world between developed North and underdeveloped South.

            Gaddis even perceives a new division in international society between the forces of integration and the forces of fragmentation[1].

            The characteristics of this new international scenario are, it is held, as follows: in a totally integrated world, nations States will be unable to exercise control over their frontiers, their resources, their capital, their sovereignty and their national identity; in a fragmented world, there would be anarchy in international relations in the classic Hobbesian manner. Either of these two extreme perceptions would, in Gaddis’s view, put an end to the existence of nations. Although in his evaluation the writer puts forward the view that the forces of integration will prevail over the forces of fragmentation, he offers a warning concerning the effect that this would have on the vulnerability of the nation State.

            Within this scenario, Latin America has no alternative but to move towards integration and draw up a global strategy for that purpose[2].

            In analysing the theme of collective security in Latin America, the Rio Group was selected as the sole political grouping currently in existence in the region or subregion of South America.

            As summit meetings are the most important forum used by the Rio Group, this paper will analyse their agendas from the first meeting in Acapulco, Mexico, in 1987 to date, and endeavour to determine whether they have demonstrated a trend towards fragmentation or towards integration.

            An attempt will also be made, on the basis of the evolution of the Rio Group, to establish the priority or importance attached to issues of collective security.

            In this regard, and despite divergences from the classical division between high politics and low politics, the paper will consider whether the questions included in the agenda relating to economic, political and social issues prevail over those related to strictly military matters or to collective security[3].

            For the purposes of this analysis, we have taken as variables the agendas drawn up at the summit meetings, thus overcoming the reductionism that would stem from the criterion of national interest or, in this case, regional interest[4].

            It is not the intention of the present paper to define differences within the Group of Eight, or to identify the positions of the member countries at each summit, except where it is clearly appropriate to do so in order to throw light on the possible solution of an issue.

            Nor will a relationship or linkage be established between the foreign and domestic policies of the countries involved on the basis of the political linkage suggested by Rosenau.

            I should like to point out that, for the purposes of the present paper, we have adopted the restricted conceptualization of collective security, understood essentially in this case as a political response to the issues of power and security[5].

            Following these preliminary clarifications, I will turn to the analysis of the summit meetings of the Rio Group.

Permanent Mechanism for Consultation and Concerted Political Action

            Following its original creation as the Contadora Group in 1983 to devise ways and means of solving the crisis in Central America, especially in Nicaragua, it was expanded in 1985 through the incorporation of the Support Group, thus forming the “Group of Eight”, which was composed of the followings countries: first, Colombia, Panama, Mexico and Venezuela, and later Argentina, Brazil, Peru and Uruguay.

            Once a negotiated solution had been found to the crisis in Central America, the “Group of Eight” ceased to operate as such and continued to function as the Permanent Mechanism for Consultation and Concerted Political Action – a title used starting with the Rio de Janeiro meeting in 1986. This implied the inclusion in its agenda, in addition to the Central American issue, of other aspects of the political and economic problems facing the region.

            Since 1988, the “Rio Group” or “Group of Eight” has been composed of seven countries, the Government of Panama having left temporarily because of the overthrow of President Erik Arturo del Valle by General Manuel A. Noriega in February 1988 (Meeting of Foreign Ministers in Cartagena de Indias, 25 and 26 February 1988).

            The membership of the “Rio Group” was modified at the Fourth Summit, held in Caracas on 12 and 13 October 1990, with the inclusion of Ecuador and Chile; the latter was engaged in a return to democracy after the military rule of General Augusto Pinochet.

            At the end of this meeting, four new countries were invited to join the “Rio Group”: Bolivia, Paraguay, a Central American country entrusted with coordination and the Caribbean country holding the presidency of CARICOM (the Caribbean Community).

            As far as the agenda is concerned, it may be noted that the democracy factor or variable is the mark of membership of the Group. This led to the expulsion of the Government of Panama at a time when the vast majority of the peoples of Latin America were becoming able to vote freely in elections.

            One feature of the agenda of the “Rio Group” is that it is not restrictive in nature but seeks flexibility, incorporating items as issues evolve in their complexity, and deleting others that are in the process of being solved.

            Regarding the Central American conflict, an issue which had been excluded from the agenda at the summit meeting in Caracas in 1990 on the grounds that, with the elections in Nicaragua and the Arias Plan, the objectives set by the Contadora and Support Group were being attained, the item was re-included at the summit meeting held in Cartagena de Indias in 1991. The issue became relevant once again through the existence of guerrilla movements in two States in the area: in an analysis of the situation in El Salvador, the Cartagena summit paper described as encouraging the state of negotiations between the Government and the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front; the second case involves the encouragement of negotiations between the Government of Guatemala and the guerrillas opposing it[6].

            The democracy issue acquired a lower profile in the agenda as representative Governments consolidated their position in Latin America. While it was originally linked with the issue of human rights, it is currently being addressed together with development in the context of the economic and financial crisis currently affecting the region.

            Similarly, it may be seen that the issue of external debt dropped in priority in the agenda of the “Rio Group”, and was deleted starting with the Fourth Summit held in Caracas in 1990.

            As from the Second Summit held in Punta del Este, two new items were included which would begin to grow in importance as the years passed: the drugs traffic and the environment. Although these are of great importance for the region, these is no doubt that the drugs issue is perceived differently in Latin America and in the United States. We must bear in mind that the United States, invoking drugs, intervened unilaterally with military force in Panama, also conducted manoeuvres in parts of Bolivia and attempted to blockade drug-exporting ports in Colombia.

            To round off this subject, I would say that the 1991 Declaration of Cartagena de Indias is very balanced. It speaks of shared responsibility between countries involved in production or consumption, directed towards the adoption of effective  measures to prevent and combat consumption, production and illegal traffic in narcotics and psychotropic substances, money laundering and arms sales.

            As may be observed, the issue is closely related to that of collective security, the participation of the military in repression, the arms traffic, joint manoeuvres, and so on. Drugs are dealt with differently in the United Nations, the Organization of American States, the Andean Pact, the Conference of American Armies and so on.

            Another aspect which led to examination by the “Group of Eight” relates to the entry of new members into the Organization of American States (OAS). It was included for the first time at the Third Summit, held in Ica, Peru, in 1989.

            In addition to the agenda items mentioned here, the “Group of Eight” became increasingly concerned with aspects relating to the international economy. The following issues have been dealt with, inter alia: protectionism, participation in international trade, regional integration, development finance, political dialogue with the industrialized countries and strengthening of regional organizations.

            As may be observed, the items in this list have a variety of origins, both indigenous and exogenous, but most of them are interrelated.

            As was demonstrated with the Panama case, membership of the “Group of Eight” is granted to democratic Governments. However, prior to 1989 a number of democratic countries in the area sought membership of the group without success. I am thinking in particular of Bolivia and Ecuador.

            It is for this reason that we may state that the “Rio Group” passed through two clearly differentiated phases where its membership was concerned: a restricted phase and an expanded phase.

            Initially, basically starting with its being constituted as the “Rio Group”, not all the democratic countries in the area were represented. In this first stage, which extended until 1989, the Rio Group was characterized as a group of selected countries[7].

            Starting in 1989, when changes of government occurred in various South American countries, the tendency was to extend the invitation to join to all the democratic countries in the region. With this expansion, I believe that the Rio Group is undergoing an identity crisis.

            In may perhaps be characterized as a political organ of the Latin American Integration Association, since the two bodies have the same membership. If the entry of a representative from Central America and from CARICOM is taken into account, it resembles SELA (the Latin American Economic System). In this regard, I believe that the solution lies in determining the group’s jurisdiction in South America.

            Another area in which the member countries are not in full agreement is that of the possible institutionalization of the Rio Group[8]. From the operational point of view, the proposed holding of annual summit meetings should be viewed as very positive. From a start with meetings of foreign ministers and ministers for specific sectors, presidential-level meetings are being instituted for the first time in Latin America. This annual event was unprecedented either in the region or in the inter-American (OAS) system.

            Examples of summit meetings reflect a trend in international society[9].

            The countries of the European Economic Community have instituted meetings of this type between heads of State or government, even though they are not provided for in the Treaty of Rome. Similarly, annual meetings of the members of the “Group of Seven” (industrialized countries) have been held since 1975. Although the summit meetings have a different origin, this mechanism was included in the Charter of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), which was established in 1964.

            Mention might also be made of the annual meetings held by the Presidents of the super-Powers, which, starting in 1990, took the form of consultations outside the annual framework when the international situation so required. A case in point was the special meeting on the Gulf war.

            In view of the key role traditionally played by the President of each country, the adoption of summits as a means of consultation faithfully reflects Latin American realities.

            If the meetings held in the region are viewed in sequence, the following trend may be observed: they started with bilateral declarations signed by Ministers of Foreign Affairs, which contained paragraphs referring to individual countries. This feature was repeated at the bilateral meetings held by Presidents. Very rarely did the agenda reflect the stance of the countries regarding shared problems or interests of the area.

            In the agendas drawn up by the Rio Group, problems involving a single country are taken up only exceptionally. The agenda includes the questions that affect all the member countries.

            It is interesting to note that the agendas drawn up by the Rio Group are identical to that adopted at the General Assembly of the Organization of American States held in Santiago, Chile, from 3 to 8 June 1991. At that meeting the items on the OAS agenda for the 1990s were spelled out. The questions taken into account were:

            1. Promotion of the gradual opening up of trade, the advance of scientific and technological know-how and the reduction of external debt.

            2. Support for the Enterprise for the Americas initiative and the GATT Uruguay Round negotiations.

            3. Contribution to protection of the environment through solidarity; for this purpose an Inter-American Programme of Action for Environmental Conservation has been established.

            4. Prevention and control of the consumption and production of, and illegal traffic in, drugs, as well as the laundering of the proceeds of such activities.

            5. Encouragement of regional integration processes and contribution to harmonization in the legal field, particularly as regards systems of civil law.

            6. Stimulation of cultural, scientific and technological interchanges as an instrument for integration, while ensuring full respect for each country’s cultural heritage.

            7. Expansion of technical cooperation and stimulation of transfers of technology in order to enhance the capacity for economic growth of the countries of the region.

            As can be seen, apart from the first item, the other questions on the agenda are covered in the meetings of the Rio Group.

            The fist item on the OAS agenda involves the region in taking a position on economic openness, a subject of debate in past decades and one which remains under discussion in present international economic circumstances.

            An innovation may be observed in the agenda of the Rio Group starting with the Fifth Summit Meeting, held in Cartagena de Indias in 1991. It includes an item entitled “Other issues of concerted political action”, listing various subjects without elaboration. The following are mentioned:

Revitalization of the Inter-American system; revitalization of the United Nations; the proposal made by the Government of Ecuador for the initiation of steps whereby Latin America and the Caribbean will be decleared an internationally recognized zone of peace; the proposal of the Government of Peru concerning a declaration by the Rio Group on the renunciation of weapons of mass destruction; regional energy security; the world summit for social development; the establishment of a “common market in knowledge”; protection of children; the Ibero-American Conference; terrorism; security and arms limitation; dialogue with the European Communities; and the Latin American Parliament.

            It was decided at the last meeting of the Rio Group that the next summit would be held in Argentina on the first Monday of December 1992.

                                                            Final Comments

            We must now assess how the Rio Group has been functioning; whether I is tending to bring about the integration of Latin America, and whether its preoccupation with collective security in the narrow sense has given way to economic and social concerns.

            As well as performing an extremely important function in Latin America, the Rio Group has now emerged as the leading political organization in the region.

            However, the pattern of its development calls for some comment.

            The Group’s involvement with matters pertaining g to other organizations in the region is puzzling. Since the Organization of American States is functioning normally, and all the countries in the Rio Group are members of that organization, it is difficult to understand why the agenda of the third Summit Meeting at Ica in 1989 included matters relating to the OAS. According to paragraph 27 of the declaration of that Summit:

To ensure that the OAS becomes fully representative and thereby of greater political relevance, we cordially urge the Governments of Belize, Canada, Cuba and Guyana to join in its work.

            As we know, Canada applied to join the Organization of American States, and has been a member since 1990. Belize and Guyana joined the Organization on 8 January 1991, pursuant to article 8 of the new Charter of the OAS, which was signed in Cartagena de Indias in 1985 and is now in force.

            The case of Cuba has other political implications. The Government of Cuba was expelled from the OAS in 1962; diplomatic, consular and trade sanctions were imposed on Cuba in 1964 because of the part it had played in subversive activities on Venezuelan territory. In 1975, it was envisaged that Cuba might join the OAS, but it was impossible to obtain enough votes for sanctions to be lifted, and it was decided:

That States should be free to act in accordance with their own national policies and interests in the normalization or conduct of their relations with the Republic of Cuba, at the level and in the manner deemed appropriate by each State (XVIth OAS Consultation Meeting of Ministers for Foreign Affairs, San José, Costa Rica, 1975).

            The question of Cuba was again discussed at the fifth Summit Meeting of the Rio Group, held in Cartagena de Indias in 1991. Although the subject was not referred to in the press release for that meeting, a Presidential Declaration was issued concerning the situation in Cuba. One paragraph in that declaration states:

They express their profound concern at the situation in Cuba and its future, and are willing to cooperate to the fullest extent in endeavours to bring about the enjoyment of human rights and free and open economic development in that nation, in peace, justice, freedom and democracy.

            It will be noted that, as well as the proposal for a democracy in Cuba, there was a call for its economic system to move towards “free and open development”.

            On the question of Cuba, there are two conflicting attitudes within the Rio Group. One of these is represented by the “Group of 3” (Colombia, Mexico, Venezuela), which would like to end the country’s isolation, subject to “major democratic reforms and respect for human rights”. The other position is held by Argentina, which is looking for significant undertakings on Cuba’s part so that it can join the OAS system. President Menem stated that the first three paragraphs of the Declaration had been drafted by Argentina[10]. At all events, the Rio Group is plainly anxious to secure Cuba’s admission  to the OAS by adopting a democratic system.

            Another political question on the Group’s agenda, which prompted a Presidential Declaration at the fifth Summit in Cartagena, relates to the situation in Haiti.

            On 29 September 1991 the elected President of Haiti, Jean Bertrand Aristide, was overthrown by a coup d’état. For this reason, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs within the OAS were summoned to ad hoc meetings in Washington on 3 and 8 October 1991. The OAS initially sought a negotiated solution to restore the President to office. The military refused to cooperate, and the regional organization adopted a resolution imposing an international trade embargo on Haiti.

            The Rio Group endorsed the action taken by the OAS. It urged the international community, and especially the European Community, to play a full part in supporting the embargo[11].

            As regards membership of the Rio Group, it is now much less restrictive than formerly. My own view is that the Rio Group should be the body to represent South America; this would not prevent it from holding meetings with CARICOM, Central America and other countries or integration forums. This proposal stems from the range of different characteristics found in Latin America as a whole[12].

            In international negotiating bodies, such as the Group of 77 or UNCTAD, we agree that Latin America has to be represented as a bloc, in order to maximize its trading and economic gains.

            One must also consider the foreign policy of the Rio Group, and its role on the international stage. In this area a change has been apparent since 1989. Since the Group was formed, we find that, as well as arduous negotiations on problems concerning the region, it has organized a number of meetings with other countries or regions, in an effort to raise Latin America’s profile in international society.

            Although meetings have continued at the international level, for instance with the European Economic Community and the countries  of Eastern Europe, only a limited range of meetings was held before 1989, including meetings with the United States, the Organization of African Unity, the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), etc.

            The point I am trying to make is that the Rio Group needs to broaden its horizons, and not confine itself to relations with the industrialized or semi-industrialized countries. It should also consider the possibility of South-South cooperation – between countries at different levels of development.

            Although we are now witnessing the break-up of a system which fostered ideological clashes between East and West, the differences between the developed North and the developing South still remain in international society.

            In this connection, Patricio Aylwin, the President of Chile, speaking at the inaugural meeting of the XXIst Annual Assembly of the OAS, placed emphasis on the enormous challenges now facing the continent, such as the consolidation of the new democratic order in the Americas. The main challenge, he said, is to tear down the wall of poverty which continues to separate people from one another[13].

            This paper and the subjects on the agenda at the summit meetings, points to the conclusion that economic and trade matters are of greater weight than political and military matters. It is suggested that in the course of its development, the Rio Group has focused mainly on economic or trade matters[14]. This will be apparent from Table 1.

            The Rio Group is also markedly integrationist, be comparison with the disintegration which is so evident in other regions. I hope it will acquire an even more important presence and play an even greater role in international affairs, developing new areas for international cooperation.

           

            Table I: Agenda of the Summit Meeting of the Rio Group

(Titles in this table are not necessarily identical with those in the Conference documents;

minor changes have been made for the sake of brevity)

Acapulco 1987	Punta del Este 1988	ICA 1989	Caracas 1990	Cartagena 1991
1. Peace and security 2. Democracy and human rights 3. Sustained and independent development 4. External debt 5. A just, free and open international trade system 6. Integration of Latin America and the Caribbean 7. Participation in the international economy 8. Independent and accelerated development of science and technology 9. Strengthening the negotiating capacity of the Group and of Latin America in general 10. Reaffirming cultural identity	1. Political dialogue with the industrialized countries, with Latin America and the Caribbean 2. Strengthening the regional organizations 3. Central America 4. Drug trafficking 5. Integration of Latin America 6. Finance for development and the external debt 7. Participation in the international economy, and preventing protectionism 8. Environment	1. International political and economic situation 2. Democracy and development 3. Aspects of security:     - drugs     - terrorism     - Central America     - South Atlantic 4. External debt and trade:  - external debt  - intra-Latin American debt  - international trade 5. Regional integration:   - communications and transport   - cultural integration 6. Environment 7. OAS	1. Regional integration 2. Cooperation in energy supply 3. Strategic fund for investment and the promotion of integration based on resources obtained by increasing the prices raw materials 4. Initiative for the Americas 5. Uruguay round of GATT 6. Environment 7. ALADI 8. OAS 9. Dialogue with the EEC 10. Support for Peru 11. Protection of children 12. Drugs	1. New economic situation of Latin America 2. Regional integration 3. Central America 4. Initiative for the Americas 5. International trade 6. Drugs 7. Environment and development 8. Indigenous peoples 9. UNCTAD VIII in Cartagena 10. Haiti 11. Other aspects of political cooperation:     - OAS     - United Nations     - Latin America as a zone of peace     - renouncing weapons mass destruction     - security of energy supplies     - social development     - a common market in knowledge     - protection of children     - an Ibero-American Conference     - terrorism     - security and arms control

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[1] John Lewis Gaddis, “Toward the post-cold-war world”, in Foreign Affairs, New York, Spring 1991, Vol. 70, No. 2, pp. 102-122.

[2]  A global strategy tends to increase the negotiating capacity of the South vis-á-vis the North, and to overcome the backwardness and stagnation of individual countries, and will reshape international society according to the dictates of justice, emphasizing the solidarity of all those seeking this goal. We have described this strategy in “Teorías y propuestas de relaciones internacionales para los países del Sur” in Cuadernos de Política Exterior Argentina, Working paper No. I, CERIR, Rosario, September 1987, and in the work by various authors entitled “Teorías de relaciones internacionales y de derecho internacional en América Latina”, Institute for Advanced Latin American Studies, Simón Bolivar University and Organization of American States (OAS), Caracas, 1989, p. 302.

[3] In this regard we agree with Waltz, who does not make an absolute distinction between high and low politics: “States use economic means for military and political ends; and military and political means for the achievement of economic interests”. Kenneth H. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, Reading, Mass., Addison-Wesley, 1979, p. 94.

[4] According to Tomassini, the idea of an international agenda reflects the notion that, in a world which is increasingly transnational, interdependent and complex and which is full of international bodies (governmental and non-governmental), national interests tend to be seen in increasingly sectoral, disjointed and specific terms, and are more and more difficult to encompass within the abstract notion of national interest. In such a world, this combination of special interests will naturally evolve into an international agenda, and to devise such an agenda becomes a central concern when planning foreign policy. There are said to be there essential features of the new agenda on the basis of which the various countries model their international role and relations: greater diversity, less hierarchy and more interrelationships than previously (Luciano Tomassini, Teoria y Práctica de Política Internacional, Catholic University of Chile, Santiago, 1989, p. 173).

[5] David R. Mares, “Escenarios de seguridad en Europa Oriental y América Latina”, in Estudios Internacionales, Santiago, Chile, January-March 1991, No. 93, p. 32. “In security matters, the advocates of ‘geopolitics of liberation through integration’ refer to the notion of ‘integral security’. What they mean is that Latin American security can no longer be defined on the basis of the traditionally narrow approach to military strategy adopted by the United States. Nowadays, security must be extended to many fields of human activity: the political, economic, social and cultural fields, as well as the strictly military ones” (G. Pope Atkins, Sudamérica en la década de 1990, “El desarrollo de las relaciones internacionales en una nueva era”, translated by Christina Piña, Grupo Editor Latinoamericano, Buenos Aires, 1990, p. 83).

[6] Following the summit at Cartagena de Indias, the New York Declaration was signed on 31 December 1991 between the Government and the FMLN. Mention should be made of the active role played by the Secretary-General of the United Nations in promoting this agreement.

[7] Here we refer to the testimony of Dante Caputo, the former Foreign Minister of Argentina, which sheds light on the origins, development, expansion and possible institutionalization of the Rio Group. Caputo describes how the Contadora and Support Groups were transformed and became the Rio Group. The two former Groups “initiated an intensive and continuing process of negotiation and meetings, which resulted in an extremely close bond among those eight countries. In the entire history of Latin American diplomacy, there have been virtually no links as flexible, intense and sincere as those forged in the Contadora and Support group meetings. At a certain point in that development, some of our countries in the Group invited the others to contemplate the idea that we were now dealing with a phenomenon which transcended the purpose for which we had originally formed the Group. We should therefore try to use for more ambitious purposes the capacity for dialogue and negotiation which had been created. Little by little, the idea emerged that the Contadora and Support groups should go beyond their involverment with the Central American issue and form a new organization for the continent. It should serve as a means of mobilizing attitudes, interests and negotiating capacity around a broader range of subjects than the Central American crisis” (Dante Caputo, “Grupo de los Ocho, entre Alaska y Tierra del Fuego” in Nueva Sociedad, Caracas, January-February 1991. No. 111, p. 6). Former Foreign Minister Caputo also explained in an interview why the Group should be limited at the outset to a small number of countries. “When the plane’s engines are not very powerful and the plane has to take off, it must not be overloaded. In Latin America, it has been found from experience that we could not achieve integration with everyone on board. The Cartagena Agreement is a typical case where decisions had to be taken by consensus among 11 countries, which caused permanent difficulties. This kind of arrangement requires great flexibility; any increase in numbers substantially increases the power of veto. It was therefore quite clear that the machinery was not going to work except in a small group. The great problem was how to cut it down, and we thought the only justification would be to cut it down to something which already existed: the Contadora and Support groups” (Interview with Foreign Minister Dante Caputo by Carta, America Latina Internacional, Buenos Aires, July-September 1989, No. 21, p. 264). For the origins of the Group, its membership and its institutionalization, see Alicia Frohmann. “Puentes sobre la turbulencia; la concertación política latinoamericana en los 80”, FLACSO, Santiago, Chile, 1990.

[8] When the possibility of institutionalizing the Rio Group arose, some Ministers for Foreign Affairs were extremely reluctant. “We had found (says Caputo) that the process of institutionalization had deprived the integration incentives of political will, consolidating bureaucratic machinery which quickly abandoned the original goals and fixed its own goals, independently of the political power. Strictly speaking, I think this approach was the right one, although perhaps later on we had to pay for the lack of institutional machinery” (Dante Caputo, “Grupo de los Ocho…”, op. cit., pp. 7 and 8).

[9] We adopt the terminology of an “international society”, after Henkin. “Although there is no international ‘government’, there is an international ‘society’; law includes the structure of that society, its institutions, forms and procedures for daily activity, the assumptions on which the society is founded and the concepts which permeate it, the status, rights, responsibilities and obligations of the nations which comprise that society, the various relations between them, and the effects of those relations”. Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave; Law and Foreign Policy, New York, Council on Foreign Relations, 1979, p. 14.

[10] See La Nación, Buenos Aires, 4 December 1991, p. 1. The fourth paragraph of the Declaration states: “They are, moreover, convinced that a renewed dialogue between Cuba and the countries of the entire continent, in a climate of détente, will facilitate changes and help to resolve outstanding problems, in accordance with international law”.

[11] What is of interest for the purposes of this paper, despite its treatment by the OAS, is the position of the various countries on the principle of non-intervention. Faced with the events ion Haiti, two attitudes were discernible within the OAS: the hard-liners, led by Argentina and Venezuela, favoured an armed intervention to protect democracy; on the other hand, Mexico, Brazil and Uruguay were reluctant to infringe the principle of non-intervention. They asked what limits would be placed on collective intervention, and on what basis it would be carried out.

[12] There are definable differences among the subregions in Latin America. South America, Central America and the Caribbean are regarded as distinct subregions for analytical purposes only, without prejudice to the part played by the region as a whole in a global strategy.

[13] XXIst General Assembly of the Organization of American States, Santiago, Chile, 3-8 June 1991.

[14] I am referring here to the arguments of Richard Rosecrance in The rise of the trading state; Commerce and conquest in the modern world, Basic Books, Inc., New York, 1986. Rosecrance’s main idea is that there is a new trade-based approach to international relations whereby war can be averted in future and new patterns of cooperation can be formed among States. He says that the advantages of cooperation in general, and of trade in particular, are so important nowadays that they vastly exceed the gains to be derived from military confrontation and territorial expansionism. This does not mean that military antagonism will disappear. In the author’s view, a degree of armed equilibrium is even needed if the trade system is to work properly. The opening-up of Customs barriers, the lowering of tariffs and the enhanced efficiency of transport, together with expanding markets, offer new incentives to many countries.

According to Rosecrance, students of international politics tend to speak of trade in pejorative terms, regarding it as a matter of low-grade policy by contrast with the high politics of sovereignty, national interests, power or military force. Yet it may be that relations among States are undergoing a radical change, due to the “low-grade trade policy”. He draws on the examples of Japan and Germany to illustrate this idea.

To these remarks by Rosecrance, one may add that trading concerns may well, in the 1990s, engender conflicts among nations. A subsidy war is now taking place between the European Economic Community and the other countries participating in the GATT negotiations, and the protectionism practiced by Japan against imports is mainly affecting manufactured goods from the United States. Instances like these tend to impede the flow of international trade.